Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Philosophy
Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated?
Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel)
Diplomacy; Europe -- Politics and government
The Prime Minister interrupted him with: “I ought to say that it is
not true.” Lord Cecil thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having
elicited this explanation, “because,” he stated, “it was certainly
widely believed that the Government has engaged in a military
policy of an adventurous kind and that if such a policy had actually
been contemplated by the Government it would involve a very serious
consideration of the military resources of the country.” As a matter of
fact, the latter was a just conclusion from the actual situation as it
really existed, notwithstanding the denial by the Prime Minister.
In March, 1913, when during the discussion of the Navy estimates, the
Mediterranean situation came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr.
Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be trusting to France
the duty of guarding the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the
course of these discussions: “In conjunction with the Navy of France,
our Mediterranean Fleet would make a combined force superior to all
possible combinations.” Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke referred to this as a
remarkable statement, and one “somewhat difficult to reconcile with the
recent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to our understanding with
France in the matter of armaments.” He added: “In one case we have the
Prime Minister repudiating an obligation on our side of any kind, and
in the other we have the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the
safety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our food supply, upon the
assistance which he presumes will be ready at any moment to be given to
us by France.”
On March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, made a comprehensive
answer to a question of Sir W. Byles in the following terms:
“As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any
obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels
it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between
European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will
restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to
decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war.”
In August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a statement to the effect that the
very friendly relationships with France rendered the situation in the
Mediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11, 1914, this same general
matter was up again for discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a
question, referred back to the statement made by Mr. Asquith on March
24, 1913, and added: “It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago.”
The nation was meanwhile left entirely in the dark with respect to the
actual matter of the relationships which had developed between Great
Britain and France, and it was only after the Great War had broken
out that Sir Edward Grey, in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to
Parliament some account of what had actually happened.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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