When we discussed the conditions which, according to our experience, are decisive in the development of hysterical phenomena from psychic traumas, we were forced to speak of abnormal states of consciousness in which such pathogenic presentations originate, and we had to emphasize the fact that the recollection of the effective psychic trauma is not to be found in the normal memory of the patient but in the hypnotized memory. The more we occupied ourselves with these phenomena the more certain became our convictions _that the splitting of consciousness, so striking in the familiar classical cases of double consciousness, exists rudimentarily in every hysteria, and that the tendency to this dissociation, and with it the tendency towards the appearance of abnormal states of consciousness which we comprehend as “hypnoid states,” is the chief phenomenon of this neurosis_. In this view we agree with Binet and with both the Janets about whose most remarkable findings in anesthetics we have had no experience. Hence, to the often cited axiom, “Hypnosis is artificial hysteria,” we would like to add another: “The existence of hypnoid states is the basis and determination of hysteria.” These hypnoid states in all their diversities agree among themselves and with hypnosis in the fact that their emerged presentations are very intensive but are excluded from the associative relations of the rest of the content of consciousness. The hypnoid states are associable among themselves, and their ideation may thus attain various high degrees of psychic organization. In other respects the nature of these states and the degree of their exclusiveness differ from the rest of the conscious processes as do the various states in hypnosis, which range from light somnolence to somnambulism, and from perfect memory to absolute amnesia. If such hypnoid states already exist before the manifested disease they prepare the soil upon which the affect establishes the pathogenic memories and their somatic resulting manifestations. This behavior corresponds to the predisposed hysteria. But the results of our observations show that a severe trauma (like that of a traumatic neurosis) or a painful suppression (perhaps of a sexual affect) may bring about a splitting of presentation groups even in persons otherwise not predisposed. This would then be the mechanism of the psychically acquired hysteria. Between the extremes of these two forms we have to admit a series in which the facility of dissociation in the concerned individuals and the magnitude of the affect of the trauma vary inversely.