Shock and Awe — Achieving Rapid Dominance — John Shaqi
Shock and Awe — Achieving Rapid DominanceUllman, Harlan
History
Shock and Awe — Achieving Rapid Dominance
Ullman, Harlan
Rapid dominance (Military science)
The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that
define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and
control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in
order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces
and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems
and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide
the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that
include both the MRC and OOTW.
Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application
In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid Dominance,
it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is
likely to be employed. As we enter the next century, the probability
is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a
peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without
compelling reasons, public tolerance toward American sacrifice abroad
will remain low and may even decrease. This reluctance on the part of
Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of
threat to U.S. interests. Without a clear and present danger, the
definition of national interest may remain narrow.
Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military
solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to
be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable
before American political staying power is exhausted. In this period,
political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more
prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for
minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, U.S.
involvement.
Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct"
alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to presenting the
nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and
irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not politically
feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while
exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. Military operations that
impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to
suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids)
also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated
situations. For example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or
other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling
impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy
may be the ultimate victim.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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