‘A battery of field artillery, howitzer battery, and Lyttelton’s brigade are across the Tugela River at Potgieter’s Drift. The enemy’s position is being bombarded by us. Five miles higher up Warren has crossed the river by a pontoon bridge, eighty-five yards long, and hopes that his force will, by this evening, have advanced five miles from the river. To his right front the enemy are busily intrenching.’ CHAPTER II POSITION OF AFFAIRS Leaving Sir Charles Warren on the north side of the Tugela in advance of Trichard’s Drift and Sir Redvers Buller at Spearman’s Hill, with Major-General Lyttelton at Potgieter’s, let us pause to consider the general position of affairs. In order to understand it we must know the features of the country between the Tugela and Ladysmith, the relief of which was the object of the operations; the numbers of the forces employed on each side; the positions occupied by the enemy, and the ways in which they could best be attacked. We cannot do better, in the first instance, than quote from Sir Charles Warren himself as to the country between the Tugela and Ladysmith and the strategy adopted. The extract is from a contribution last autumn to the ‘National Review’ entitled ‘Lessons from the South African War.’ ‘If the Colonial farm map[3] is examined it will be seen that immediately south of Ladysmith is the rugged country of Grobelaar’s Kloof, extending to the Tugela and Colenso, some twelve miles from Ladysmith, and that the only practicable directions of advance within easy access of the rail-head at Frere were that to the right, following the line of railway to Pieters through very rugged mountains, and that to the left, by Potgieter’s and Skiet’s Drifts, through comparatively open country, with a fairly good wagon road of sixteen miles from Frere to Potgieter’s Drift, and a good wagon road of fourteen miles into Ladysmith over open country, the only hills to be met with being those commanding Potgieter’s Drift from the south, and Lancers Hill, held by the Boers investing Ladysmith and six miles from that city. This open country is, however, commanded on the south by the Doorn Kloof range resting on the Tugela. ‘It was the left-hand advance that was chosen, but, though the Boer lines on the north side of the Tugela about Potgieter’s Drift and Vaalkrantz were commanded by the high ground of Mount Alice and Zwart Kop, 1,000 feet above the Tugela, the attack was not at once made upon their position. Again, there was a choice of making a détour, either to the right by Doorn Kloof, or to the left over the Spion Kop range and its adjuncts. ‘So far as the map will indicate there is much in favour of an advance by Doorn Kloof, particularly because its possession seemed to be a necessity to cover the advance over the open country between Potgieter’s Drift and Lancers Hill.