Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was quoting, he has had the hardihood to say, "that although Sir George Prevost fully acknowledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the reinforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered _above five weeks_ to elapse before he _despatched_ the small amount of regular troops, &c."[57] Now it appears from General de Rottenburg's letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 41st, _had been despatched_ to Amherstburgh on the 6th July; and by a return made to the Military Secretary's Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter's army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th August, 1813, it further appears, that up to the _10th August_, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, with nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, _had arrived at that post_, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provincial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly requested, by General Procter, in his correspondence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him. It may here be observed, that General Procter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical situation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Amherstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rottenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to General Procter, without injury to the more important service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier. Having thus proved that, as far as depended upon Sir George Prevost, General Procter's requisitions, of every description, had been complied with, we now proceed to shew that he did not neglect our marine on Lake Erie. The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, has not hesitated to say, "that in the whole course of that vacillation and error, which unhappily distinguished the administration of Sir George Prevost,[58] his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant and palpable, in the circumstances which led to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie." These censures, unfounded as they are, may perhaps be thought to require a more particular and detailed reply.