It is contended that the withdrawal of a picquet rests, except in special circumstances, entirely with the picquet leader. He is the man on the spot, and can best judge when the retirement should commence. The rear-guard commander should rarely attempt to regulate the actions of the picquets, of whose situation he cannot have adequate knowledge, but should exercise general supervision, ready to afford assistance if required. At times picquets may be able to support one another's movements, but, as a rule, a picquet will be too fully occupied with its own affairs to be able to render assistance to its neighbours. The above outline of a withdrawal presupposes that hostile pressure is not unduly severe. If the enemy venture to close with the rear-guard and picquets, it is submitted that an immediate counter-attack should be delivered, the main body being halted. To lose so golden an opportunity of inflicting loss on a volatile foe seems on the one hand unwise, whilst, on the other, it is surely both undignified and demoralising to permit savages to hunt British regulars into camp. The delivery of a counter-attack is accompanied by some risk, and its success will depend on the aptitude of the rear-guard commander for stratagem, for, if loss is to be inflicted, the enemy must, as a rule, be trapped. Simple ruses which suggest themselves are, either to attempt to attract the tribesmen into the low ground by a bait of ammunition or transport animals, the cavalry, guns, and part of rear-guard, infantry being previously concealed in positions from which they can take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, and the retirement of picquets stopped, as soon as the attack is delivered. Or, two or more picquets, which have been previously reinforced by troops moving along concealed lines of advance to the hill tops, may feign retirement, and attack the tribesmen as they follow over the crest line. If stratagem fails, the column should halt and drive off the enemy, a proceeding which should be repeated until he is taught that to follow up British troops is neither profitable nor advantageous. ATTACK AND DEFENCE. Success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success against the inhabitants of the North Western Frontier, a knowledge of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the British aims are pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be met and defeated. The tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when one is running away from them. They fight well in positions strongly fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure against their flanks.