Pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops. They are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and are not prone to accept battle unless surprised. Like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their fire is accurate. On the other hand, owing to their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal fire as a rule lacks volume. The tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in mass. On the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions with men. They are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition. The fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms, renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a pitch of fanaticism. Pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe that there is little fear of interference after dark. Their enterprises are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible. Their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however, usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on. From the above description it will be seen that British troops, so long as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear from the tribesmen. But it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated. The composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. Columns composed of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required, should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are favourable. Artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should, within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and to encourage resistance. The military value of the enemy must not, however, be underestimated. The main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive success. To this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them.