In attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance. Supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance. Fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after having caused a few casualties at long range. As the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations. To gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the training manuals requires no modification. Artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. Its aim should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to inflict loss when he retreats. The steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather than frontal fire should be employed. It is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between infantry and artillery. In tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory. Pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required direction, whilst the cavalry press forward. A portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line. Pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys. Though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted. In these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to embarrass the British movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is both dangerous and unprofitable. Mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage his zeal for pursuit. Should he, however, persist in following up the troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement discontinued. The enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule, offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause than to avoid casualties.