It is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the British, afford losses, especially of arms. Commanders, without being prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. If the tribesmen's losses are heavy, those of the British troops will probably be considerably less. Close fighting is all to the advantage of trained soldiers. As has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to battle in conditions favourable to the British, unless they can be outwitted or surprised. Night operations may, therefore, frequently be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill tops, the enemy will overlook all manoeuvres. As the natives are not often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present unusual difficulties. The enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. But, owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract their attention from outflanking movements. This may be possible, for they fight with confidence when behind cover. Mere frontal attack is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport animals, to tempt the Pathans from their hills. Though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be lost sight of, the British advantage in training and armament should enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment. Good information and staff work, and a sound system of inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success. Commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart. When a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention. In minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape punishment.