But suppose a Man does not marry for Money, though for one that does not, perhaps there are thousands that do; suppose he marries for Love, an Heroick Action, which makes a mighty Noise in the World, partly because of its Rarity, and partly in regard of its Extravagancy, what does his marrying for Love amount to? There’s no great Odds between his marrying for the Love of Money, or for the Love of Beauty; the Man does not act according to Reason in either Case, but is govern’d by irregular Appetites. But he loves her Wit perhaps, and this, you’ll say, is more Spiritual, more Refin’d: Not at all, if you examine it to the Bottom. For what is that which now a-days passes under the Name of Wit? A bitter and ill-natur’d Raillery, a pert Repartee, or a confident talking at all; and in such a multitude of Words, it’s Odds if something or other does not pass that is surprizing, though every Thing that surprizes does not please; some Things being wonder’d at for their Ugliness, as well as others for their Beauty. True Wit, durst one venture to describe it, is quite another Thing; it consists in such a Sprightliness of Imagination, such a Reach and Turn of Thought, so properly express’d, as strikes and pleases a judicious Taste. For though, as one says of Beauty, _’tis in no Face, but in the Lover’s Mind_, so it may be said of some sorts of Wit, it is not in him that speaks, but in the Imagination of his Hearer; yet doubtless there is a true Standard-Wit, which must be allow’d for such by every one who understands the Terms. I don’t say that they shall all _equally_ like it; and it is this Standard-wit that always pleases, the Spurious does so only for a Season. Now what is it that strikes a judicious Taste? Not that, to be sure, which injures the Absent, or provokes the Company, which poisons the Mind under Pretence of entertaining it, proceeding from, or giving Countenance to false Notions, to dangerous and immoral Principles. Wit indeed is distinct from Judgment, but it is not contrary to it; ’tis rather its Handmaid, serving to awaken and fix the Attention, that so we may judge rightly. Whatever charms, does so because of its Regularity and Proportion; otherwise, though it is Extraordinary and out of the Way, it will only be star’d on like a Monster, but can never be lik’d. And tho’ a Thought is ever so fine and new, ever so well express’d, if it suits not with Decorum and good Manners, it is not just and fit, and therefore offends our Reason, and consequently has no real Charms, nor would afford us any Entertainment, if our Taste were not deprav’d.