Greece -- History -- Peloponnesian War, 431-404 B.C. -- Fiction
The whole armament now weighed anchor from Corcyra and sailed in three
divisions, each commanded by one of the generals, to the opposite coast
of Italy. On arriving at Rhegium, an Ionic city on the Italian side of
the strait, they received permission to beach their ships, and form a
camp outside the walls; and here they waited for the return of three
fast-sailing triremes, which had been sent forward from Corcyrato carry
the news of their approach to Egesta, and claim the promised subsidy,
and at the same time to sound the temper of the Greek cities in Sicily.
Before long the ships came back with their report, and the Athenians
now learned to their great chagrin that all the fabled wealth of Egesta
had dwindled to the paltry sum of thirty talents.
The three generals now held a council of war, to decide on a plan of
campaign. It was evident that no help was to be obtained from Egesta,
and the attitude of the Rhegini, who declined to enter their alliance,
boded ill for the success of the expedition. As their prospects were so
discouraging, Nicias proposed to confine their operations within the
narrowest limits, to patch up a peace between Selinus and Egesta, to
aid the Leontines, if it could be done without risk or expense, and
after making a display of the Athenian power, to sail home to Athens.
Alcibiades protested strongly against such a course, as disgraceful to
Athens, and unworthy of the splendid armament entrusted to their
command. Let them try first what could be effected by negotiation with
the Greek cities and native tribes of Sicily, and after gaining as many
allies as possible in the island, let them proceed to the attack of
Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus, on the other hand, a plain, downright
soldier, was for sailing straight to Syracuse, and striking immediately
at the heart of Sicily. The city, he argued, would be found unprepared,
and if they acted at once, in the first terror of their presence, they
were certain of victory; but if they waited, their men would lose
heart, the efficiency of the fleet would be impaired, and the
Syracusans would gather strength and courage from the delay.
How true was the forecast of Lamachus was proved by the event; but his
bold plan was distasteful alike to the timid temper of Nicias, and to
the tortuous, intriguing spirit of Alcibiades. Finding, therefore, that
he had no hope of convincing his colleagues, he voted for the middle
course, and accordingly the plan of Alcibiades, unquestionably the
worst of the three, was adopted.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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