III. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of Thinking 49 By JOHN DEWEY IV. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Content and Object of Thought 65 By JOHN DEWEY V. Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 86 By HELEN BRADFORD THOMPSON, Ph.D., Director of the Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College VI. Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment 127 By SIMON FRASER MCLENNAN, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Oberlin College VII. The Nature of Hypothesis 142 By MYRON LUCIUS ASHLEY, Ph.D., Instructor, American Correspondence School VIII. Image and Idea in Logic 183 By WILLARD CLARK GORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology in the University of Chicago IX. The Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy 203 By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in Iowa College X. Valuation as a Logical Process 227 By HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART, Ph.D., Instructor in Philosophy in the State University of Iowa XI. Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 341 By ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago I THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY No one doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distinct from what is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is derivative and secondary. It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of something. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is of this reflective type. We think about; we reflect over. If we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought; if we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought intervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the logical problem: the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to reality.