It is commonly believed that attention to a feeling intensifies it—that the more we attend to our feelings the stronger they are, and the less attention we pay to them the weaker they are. A soldier wounded on the field of battle heeds not the pain in the excitement of the conflict. But the truth is in this case that he has no pain so long as he feels none, and that he does not attend to the pain signifies simply that pain does not become a psychic fact, but is wholly physiological, and so not a subject for psychological discussion. This is a case of the confusing use of attention for consciousness in general which we have before criticised. Very often, indeed, such an expression as, “The more he attends to his pain the more he has,” means simply, the more pain he has the more he feels, an identical proposition. But we must also discriminate between attention in a feeling and attention to a feeling. I work myself up into a passion by strenuously dwelling on representations involved in anger—this is an attention in a feeling; but attention to anger would be self-observational effort. The former does not involve consciousness of the feeling, the latter is nothing more than strenuous consciousness of the feeling. Men are often angry without being conscious of it or but dimly so, and attention to the feeling would consist in intensifying by will effort this consciousness. When a person says, “I was mad and I knew it,” he asserts the distinctness of the acts and that the first does not always imply the second. This cognition originally, like all cognition, required volition, and it is still subject to volitional control and emphasis, that is attention, even in advanced consciousness. Attention to a feeling is cognitive effort in attaining or strengthening consciousness of feeling, hence is but a mode of apperceptive or introspective effort. We must distinguish sharply then between the observing act and the observed feeling, between a cognition of consciousness of pain and a pain consciousness, and we must note that attention may be either, neither, or both. Apperception has become such a habit with higher human consciousness that it is commonly exercised without attention, and so has seemed to some as a necessary fact of all consciousness, an anthropomorphism, which seems to us erroneous. When we are conscious we are generally conscious that we are conscious; when a man has toothache there is not only pain, ache, toothache, but consciousness of this as fact of experience; but this does not establish apperception as fact of all consciousness.