significant. It means at least that this _stating_ it—being merely objectifying act—destroys the subjectifying which is its essence. The radical distinction and polar opposition of subjectifying and objectifying is therein suggested, and the difficulty of all fruitful discussion and scientific investigation, which is objectifying, is made apparent. The objective cognition of a self can only mean cognition of an object capable of experience. Objects are thus discriminated into two classes—experiencers and non-experiencers, subject-objects and bare objects; but this is not self-sense whereby the experiencer directly knows _his own_ experience as such, but merely sense of a self as any individual object experiencing. This objective definition of a self is simple enough. It merely asserts that any object which at any moment of its persistence or existence has a consciousness or experience of any kind is thereby a self. But this is obviously not a definition of the self and self-sense as psychic act, nor does it explain it. The scientific statement that individual objects exist as experiencers, and so are personalities, or _ego_'s, does not clear up the self-sense whereby the individual is aware of his own individuality as such. Egohood as selfishness in this objective sense, and ego-hood as self-experience, as a feeling and knowing myself, are quite distinct. To the question, What makes an object—this particular object, body with limbs and various organs capable of feeling pain-pleasure—what makes this _myself_? the only answer is relation not, be it noted, to experience, but to _my_ experience felt as such. And what makes an experience mine is that I consciously experience it; not merely that I experience—that experience occurs to me, or in me, as objective fact—but that I consciously experience, subjectively realize the experience as _mine_; not merely as realizing experience as experience, but as _mine own_. This ceaseless circle into which we fall in trying to define _ego_ is hinted at in various common expressions. A child even will often remark, “I did not do it, my hand did it”; “you did not touch _me_, you touched my _foot_,” etc. That is, even the most cursory observation asserts that object in itself is not subject, that the me is not mine. While, then, we must regard self-cognition as a _genus_ by itself and as unanalyzable simple psychic fact, arising early upon a very slight basis of experience, and continually developing as most important psychosis for life, we may yet distinguish what is involved with it, what modes of consciousness it presupposes, and from which it yet is distinct.