half asleep we may experience succession of consciousnesses without noting succession, each phase standing alone in itself and by itself. While consciousness is maintained as consciousness—that is, a continuance of conscious states—by the change, it is obviously not necessary to this that there should be awareness of change. Here as elsewhere we must keep clear of the mistake of making consciousness more than a general term for a group of phenomena. Consciousness as such has no reality or existence, but merely denominates a sum of consciousnesses. The phrase, change of consciousness, and similar expressions easily convey the impression that consciousness is a changing something. But we know that consciousness does not exist as a general indefinite something which changes or has other properties, but is merely a name for certain activities and functions. The formula of Mr. Ward’s hardly applies to developed consciousness, much less to undeveloped. Consciousness even in man cannot be regarded as a something which changes in sensation and presentation forms as pure givens, determined with immediate completeness from without, and these changes perceived, and pleasure and pain result. On the contrary the immediateness and spontaneity of presentation forms in our ordinary adult human consciousness are in appearance only; they stand first before us because they have reached a dominance through heredity and education, but still the latent and inward order is always from feeling to knowledge and not _vice versâ_. The accomplishment of presentation is usually so marvellously rapid in perceptive beings, and acts upon such slight incentive that it is only under very rare conditions of regression, or when developing a new sense or new form of sense that we see that the moving element in mentality is pure feeling. Thus, for example, in being awakened from sound sleep by a bright light suddenly brought into the room, the order of consciousness is, pure feeling of pain, sensation of light, perception of lighted object, and not the reverse; whenever we can catch consciousness gradually awakening we can always identify this order. The lighted lamp, objectively speaking, certainly caused the feeling of discomfort with which consciousness began, and this feeling roused the mind to both sensation of light and perception of lamp. I, of course, have a feeling as to the visible object only after seeing it, but this is altogether distinct from the feeling which incites to the seeing. A vague, undifferentiated pain or pleasure is always initiative, but pure pleasure-pain is often so low in intensity that it does not start any cognitive act.