The need of a closer psychological definition and interpretation of ethical emotion must be apparent to any reader of the current psychology, where we find the utmost confusion and looseness of usage. One of the most glaring instances which I have come across is this from Perez (_First Three Years of Childhood_, p. 286): “As soon as the child begins to obey, from fear or from habit, he enters on the possession of the moral sense; as soon as he obeys in order to be rewarded or praised or to give pleasure, he has advanced further in this possession.” A boy at table reaches out for the last piece of cake, but withdraws his hand out of love for his mother’s approbation, and fear of her disapprobation. Does this imply moral sense and emotion? We say, indeed, that these were very proper and moral emotions for the child to have; objectively moral, but we do not describe the psychical state of the child correctly by saying that it has the moral sense and emotion. In fact, just so far as he acts out of love or fear, just so far he is not acting out of ethical emotion; that is, simply because he feels he ought. Only the slightest introspection, then, is needed to recognise the distinction of objective and subjective morality, of a moral emotion and the emotion of morality. So we must disallow even dread of “moral discomfort” as psychically moral, Spencer notwithstanding (_Essays_ I., p. 348). The fear of remorse may restrain from objectively immoral acts, but the ethical emotion is not a fear constraint, as every one knows when doing a thing simply because he feels he ought to. Because I judge my feeling or act a right one, does not constitute this the feeling of rightness as psychic fact. In short, we must always distinguish between the socially right action, the morally right action, and the psychologically moral action. He who erects a model tenement, even though he do it to advertise himself, is doing the right thing by society, though his action is neither prompted by a moral emotion nor the moral emotion. If philanthropy incites him, both the act and feeling objectively are moral, but psychically he is immoral, and only becomes psychically moral when he acts out of the ethical emotion as feeling of duty. One who acts out of sympathy, pity, mercy, affection, feeling of honour, love of approbation, and similar emotions, often confounded with the moral emotion, is objectively moral. We pronounce these to be right emotions, yet they are not the emotion of right, and so not psychically moral; and it is evident, also, that they may not be socially right, for often actions from these motives result in social wrongs. However, in later phases of psychic evolution, when emotions themselves are reflected upon as psychic acts, the emotion of the moral “ought” may be felt as stimulus to them, and so we may at once feel that we ought to sympathise, and so sympathise, and so act, and may thus at the same time be psychically, morally and socially right.