Submarine Warfare of To-day: How the Submarine Menace Was Met and Vanquished, with Descriptions of the Inventions and Devices Used, Fast Boats, Mystery Ships, Nets, Aircraft, &c. &c., Also Describing the Selection and Training of the Enormous Personnel Used in This New Branch of the NavyDomville-Fife, Charles W. (Charles William)
History
Submarine Warfare of To-day: How the Submarine Menace Was Met and Vanquished, with Descriptions of the Inventions and Devices Used, Fast Boats, Mystery Ships, Nets, Aircraft, &c. &c., Also Describing the Selection and Training of the Enormous Personnel Used in This New Branch of the Navy
Domville-Fife, Charles W. (Charles William)
Submarine warfare; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine
"In time of war there has always been an intimate
connection between the Royal Navy and the Merchant
Service. Latterly, and more especially since the
Russian War of 1854 to 1856, this fact tended to
be forgotten, partly because men-of-war developed
on particular lines and became far more unlike
merchantmen than they had ever been before, and
also because, by the introduction of continuous
service, the personnel of the Navy seemed to have
developed into a separate caste, distinguished by
its associations, traditions and _esprit de
corps_, as much by its special training and
qualifications, from other seafaring men. This war
has proved once again, to such as needed proof,
that the two services cannot exist without each
other, and that the Sea Power of the Empire is not
its naval strength alone, but its maritime
strength. Even at the risk of insisting on the
obvious, it is necessary to repeat that, for an
Island Empire, a war at sea cannot be won merely
by the naval action which defeats the enemy; naval
successes are of value for the fruit they bear,
the chief of which is the power that they give to
the victor to maintain his own sea-borne trade and
to interrupt that of the enemy.
"An elementary way of looking at the problems of
manning the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service
is to consider that there is in the country a
common stock of seamen, on which both can draw.
But this theory, like many others equally obvious
and tempting, has the disadvantage that it leaves
important factors out of account and, if worked
out, results in an absurdity. Thus, shortly before
war began there were in the country some 420,000
seamen, of whom one-third were in the Navy and
two-thirds engaged in merchant ships and fishing
vessels. There was no considerable body of
unemployed seamen. During the war the personnel of
the Navy was expanded to something like the
420,000 which represents the common stock of
seamen. Therefore, if the theory met the case,
there would have been no men left for the Merchant
Service. But the merchant ships, in spite of
difficulty and danger, continued to run, employing
great numbers of men. And we must not forget to
take into account the number of men, amounting to
48,000 killed and 4500 prisoners of war, who have
been lost in the two services during the war. So
it comes to this, that the common stock of seamen,
or at least of men fit to man ships, has expanded
during the war by more than 50 per cent. Whence
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