This matter in dispute arose again in 1845 in the case of Schwabe _v._ Clift; the deceased drank sulphuric acid, and died, when clearly insane. The jury returned a verdict of death during insanity, intending thereby to say that the policy should not be void. In this policy the term used was “suicide,” and the judge, Cresswell, held that this word meant felo-de-se. On appeal, this judgment was reversed, the judges again differing; the majority held that the clause meant “intentionally killing himself,” whether in a reasonable state of mind or not; the minority were of opinion that disease of the senses, or the reason, leading to suicide, was not intentional death, nor such as ought to cause a forfeiture. This decision of the judges was of great importance, and led the companies to alter the wording of their policies, for under the old system any one who in an attack of delirium during a fever, or after an accident, should jump out of a window and kill himself, would thereby forfeit his policy; the public could not put up with this dictum, which if law, is not the equity of the case. Some companies inserted clauses which provided for compromises of such claims; others definitely stated that any voluntary death should avoid a policy, but reserved to themselves the right to return a part of the policy value, calculated up to the day of death. At the present time, however, policies, which in theory are avoided by suicide, are almost always practically paid by the companies, in full, or nearly so, unless there be any reason to suspect the existence of a fraudulent intention on the part of the assured. It may be broadly stated that now, in 1885, the companies have almost all agreed to make assigned policies indisputable. The following axioms will be found of great value:─ When the assured, being himself beneficially interested in the assurance, dies a felo-de-se, public policy requires that the contract be rendered void. And the same holds good of those who claim under the assured, should he have assigned it, whether for valuable consideration or not. Bunyon, p. 74. But when the assured is but the nominee of the assurer, and has no beneficial interest in the insurance, neither equity nor public policy require the insurance to be avoided; still, this point has not been judicially fixed. Pope, p. 351. When the suicide is insane, the policy is not avoided, unless by special condition of the policy. See Horn _v._ Anglo-Australian Ass. Co. A condition may be inserted that if the policy be assigned to a third person, and in favour of that assignee or those claiming under him, such shall not be void; and the Courts have decided that the insuring company may be the assignee. See White _v._ Brit. Emp. Ass. Co. 7 L. R. Equity, 394. If a condition were inserted that the policy should not lapse, even if the assured killed himself when of sound mind, and when beneficially interested, it would be void in law from public policy.