Systematic Theology (Volume 1 of 3)Strong, Augustus Hopkins
Religion
Systematic Theology (Volume 1 of 3)
Strong, Augustus Hopkins
Baptists -- Doctrines; Theology, Doctrinal
But Dr. C. M. Mead, Ritschl’s Place in the History of Doctrine,
has well shown that Ritschl has not followed Lotze. His
“value-judgments” are simply an application to theology of the
“regulative” principle of Kant. He holds that we can know things
not as they are in themselves, but only as they are for us. We
reply that what things are worth for us depends on what they are
in themselves. Ritschl regards the doctrines of Christ’s
preexistence, divinity and atonement as intrusions of metaphysics
into theology, matters about which we cannot know, and with which
we have nothing to do. There is no propitiation or mystical union
with Christ; and Christ is our Example, but not our atoning
Savior. Ritschl does well in recognizing that love in us gives
eyes to the mind, and enables us to see the beauty of Christ and
his truth. But our judgment is not, as he holds, a merely
subjective value-judgment,—it is a coming in contact with
objective fact. On the theory of knowledge held by Kant, Hamilton
and Spencer, see Bishop Temple, Bampton Lectures for 1884:13; H.
B. Smith, Faith and Philosophy, 297-336; J. S. Mill, Examination,
1:113-134; Herbert, Modern Realism Examined; M. B. Anderson, art.:
“Hamilton,” in Johnson’s Encyclopædia; McCosh, Intuitions,
139-146, 340, 341, and Christianity and Positivism, 97-123;
Maurice, What is Revelation? Alden, Intellectual Philosophy,
48-79, esp. 71-79; Porter, Hum. Intellect, 523; Murphy, Scientific
Bases, 103; Bib. Sac. April, 1868:341; Princeton Rev., 1864:122;
Bowne, Review of Herbert Spencer, 76; Bowen, in Princeton Rev.,
March, 1878:445-448; Mind, April, 1878:257; Carpenter, Mental
Physiology, 117; Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 109-113;
Iverach, in Present Day Tracts, 5: No. 29; Martineau, Study of
Religion, 1:79, 120, 121, 135, 136.
3. God’s revelation of himself to man.
_In God’s actual revelation of himself and certain of these relations._—As
we do not in this place attempt a positive proof of God’s existence or of
man’s capacity for the knowledge of God, so we do not now attempt to prove
that God has brought himself into contact with man’s mind by revelation.
We shall consider the grounds of this belief hereafter. Our aim at present
is simply to show that, granting the fact of revelation, a scientific
theology is possible. This has been denied upon the following grounds:
A. That revelation, as a making known, is necessarily internal and
subjective—either a mode of intelligence, or a quickening of man’s
cognitive powers—and hence can furnish no objective facts such as
constitute the proper material for science.
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