The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM
GOD.
Beside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many
who object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it
foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not
universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_
they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion,
aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now
be shown.
Let the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any
_consequences_ which may be drawn from them.
I. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to
the material laws of the world._
=1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide
and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of
nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise
the system of grace.
=2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior
to experience.
=3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
=4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of
the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent
to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or
deviated from.
II. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree
of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given
gradually or suddenly.
=1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be
given by revelation.
=2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to
transmit any revelation he might make.
=3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or
doubtful.
=4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
=5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be
said that if not in writing it would not have answered its
purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best
suit God’s _general_ government?
=6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular
things in revelation as unsuitable.
III. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is,
whether it is a revelation._
=1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a
revelation.
=2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
=3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is
affirmed, it still should control our conduct.
IV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other
books, are not so as to the Bible._
=1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of
Scripture.
=2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
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