commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or other of the Sogdian principalities. In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army. On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy.