was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with _H_ārith against him. The plan miscarried, however; _H_ārith seized the governor and held him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession of all Eastern Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and from the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym towards Merv Rūdh to keep _H_ārith’s main body in check, he marched himself against the rebel forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter, continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile _H_ārith seems to have retreated before ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower _T_ukhāristān returned to its allegiance; on the other hand _H_ārith was now supported not only by the kings of Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus in the face of _H_ārith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while _H_ārith, after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into _T_ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā b. Khāzim at Tirmidh, he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshān. The motives of _H_ārith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated. In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in Khurāsān. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by _T_abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition into _S_ughd. Except for the scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding the effects of the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania. Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on _T_abarī 1890. 6) that “_H_ārith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the _H_ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to the administration. That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against _H_ārith follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to (_T_ab. 1585. 6-16).