The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to itBoyle, John, active 1867
History
The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to it
Boyle, John, active 1867
Ireland -- History -- War of 1689-1691
Berwick, who had remained for some days with a body of cavalry between
Drogheda and Dublin, to retard the immediate advance of the enemy on
the capital, soon after took up his march for the general rendezvous,
whither he had been preceded by the other division leaders, and in a
short time an army was assembled there exceeding by some thousands the
force that participated in the Battle of the Boyne. This, according to
the estimate of the Duke of Berwick, consisted of 4,000 cavalry, still
in good condition, and 16,000 infantry, of which only one half were
armed with muskets.
De Lausun, who had become quite disgusted with the condition of affairs
to which he had so largely contributed since his arrival, now lost
no opportunity of effecting his recall, by representing the Jacobite
cause as hopeless. Arriving at Limerick, he at once pronounced the
place untenable; commented on the forlorn condition of the troops;
the dilapidated state of its defences; ridiculed the idea of holding
it against the army of the Prince of Orange; and in the excess of
irony, declared that "his master could take it with roast-apples."
Sarsfield and Berwick thought differently. It was their principal
depot of provisions and military stores; one of the few ports of
entry that now remained in their possession, and being moreover the
key to the defences of the river, its loss would be soon followed
by the total subjugation of the island. They accordingly set their
minds on holding it to the last extremity, and being joined in this
resolution by the governor, De Boïsselau, they at once set about
strengthening its fortifications. De Lausun, finding that his motives
were understood, and that he no longer possessed the confidence or
respect of the Irish leaders, withdrew his men, military chest, and
artillery from the city, and encamped within view of it, on the Clare
side of the river, where he remained an inactive spectator of the
events that succeeded. But whatever were the motives of De Lausun,
the strait to which the city was at this time reduced could hardly be
underrated. The provisions of the garrison were quite inadequate to the
maintenance of such a force for any considerable time; its ammunition
was nearly exhausted, and there were only nine guns, and those of
inferior calibre, on its walls. The late reverse had opened up all the
country to the east of the Shannon to the arms of William, and on the
southern side, round to Cork, there was hardly a fortress capable of
offering a day's resistance. The forts of Kilkenny and Clonmel, in the
interior, which had been dismantled during the war of the Confederacy,
had been neglected during this, and could hardly retard his march from
the seaboard longer than to comply with the forms of capitulation.
Commerce, which had been hitherto carried on briskly between this
city and France, ceased as the risks increased; the shipment of
military stores was suspended; and operations in the field had become
utterly impracticable.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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