In the different propositions I have quoted, we have to deal with what is merely a fallacy in rhetorical disguise. For, from the premiss that the chromatin has the power of impressing specific character upon the protoplasm of the cell, it by no means follows that two cells, distinguishable by the nature of their plasma-products, must therefore contain different kinds of protoplasm. There are other possibilities to be reckoned with. Weismann himself knows that there is no logical necessity for the conclusion, for he himself suggests another possibility in the following: 'If we wished to assume that the whole of the determinants of the germplasm are supplied to all the cells of the entogeny, we should have to suppose that differentiation of the body is due to all the determinants except _one_ particular one remaining dormant in a regular order, and that, apart from special adaptations, only one determinant reaches the cell, viz., that which has to control it. If, however, we do make the assumption,' etc. (p. 63, English edition). Here, then, Weismann himself points out that what in other places he has attempted to represent as a necessary conclusion is but one of two alternatives. Not only does he grant the possibility of the alternative, but uses it himself in explanation of the phenomena of reproduction and development. He attributes to certain series of cells, in addition to the active rudiments controlling the normal characters of their protoplasm, the possession of numerous latent rudiments which become active when opportunity presents itself. This _non sequitur_ in his argument Weismann excuses with the remark that the presence of latent rudiments in special cases 'depends, as I believe, upon special adaptations, and is not primitive, at any rate not in higher animals and plants. Why should Nature, who always manages with economy, indulge in the luxury of always providing all the cells of the body with the whole of the determinants of the germplasm, if a single kind of them is sufficient? Such an arrangement will presumably have occurred only in cases where it serves definite purposes' (p. 63, English edition). Here, again, is a rhetorical flourish instead of a proof. But the dilemma which we are examining is not yet at an end. Supposing for the moment that we accept the assumption that different character in cells implies different character in their nuclear matter, we have at once a new and important decision to make. Does the nuclear matter in the different cells, that has arisen by division from the nuclear matter of the egg-cell, become unlike by the process of division itself? or is it only after the division that it becomes different, and in consequence of the action of outer forces upon the nuclei?