At Königgrätz: Austrians . . . . . . 215,000 " Prussians . . . . . . 220,000 ------- Total . . . . . . . 435,000 ======= According to Rüstow (_Feldhernkunst des 19ten Jahrhunderts_) the numbers engaged were:-- At Leipsic (Oct. 18th): French . . . 130,000 " " Allies . . . 290,000 ------- Total . . . . . . 430,000 ======= At Königgrätz, total of both sides 450,000 ======= CHAPTER II BEHIND THE SCENES The King of Prussia is reputed to have been a modest man and to have known the limits of his faculties. He was not a great strategist. He once said to his brother (the father of Prince Frederick Charles), "If I had not been born a Hohenzollern I should have been a sergeant-major." How then did he make the swift decision resulting in a success that would have done credit to the genius of Frederick the Great or Napoleon? The answer is supplied by the Prussian historian of the Italian campaign of 1859. "There are generals," says this writer, "who need no counsel, who deliberate and resolve in their own minds, those about them having only to carry out their intentions. But such generals are stars of the first magnitude who scarcely appear once in a century. In the great majority of cases the leader of an army will not be willing to dispense with advice. The suggestions made may very well be the result of the deliberations of a smaller or greater number of men specially qualified by training and experience to form a correct judgment. But even among them only one opinion ought to assert itself. The organization of the military hierarchy should promote subordination even in thought. This one opinion only should be submitted for the consideration of the commander-in-chief by the one person to whom this particular service is assigned. Him let the general choose, not according to rank or seniority, but in accordance with his own personal confidence. Though the advice given may not always be unconditionally the best, yet, if the action taken be consistent and the leading idea once adopted be steadfastly followed, the affair may always be brought to a satisfactory issue. The commander-in-chief retains as against his adviser the infinitely weightier merit of taking upon himself the responsibility for all that is done.