The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
Less favourable pictures of Drake have been penned, and there is no
doubt that some of his virtues have been greatly exaggerated. At the
present day there is perhaps too great a tendency to reverse the
process. Stripped of romance, many of his actions were petty, while
those of some of his fellow adventurers merit a harsher name. Hawkins,
for instance, was hand-in-glove with Spanish smugglers and a slave
trader. Many of the victories of the Elizabethan “Sea-Kings” were
really trifling little affairs, magnified into an importance which they
never possessed.
But, when all is said and done, it is in these men that we find the
birth of a sea spirit which still lingers on, despite that other
insular spirit previously referred to--the natural tendency of
islanders to regard the water itself as a bulwark, instead of the
medium on which to meet and defeat the enemy.
The Spanish, already considerably incensed by the piratical acts of the
English “gentlemen adventurers,” presently found a further cause of
grievance in the assistance rendered by Elizabeth to their revolting
provinces in the Netherlands. Drake had not returned many years from
his famous voyage when it became abundantly clear that the Spaniards no
longer intended quietly to suffer from English interference.
Spain at that time was regarded as the premier naval power of Europe.
Her superiority was more mythical than actual, for reasons which will
later on be referred to: however, her commercial oversea activities
were very great. The wealth which she wrung from the Indies--though
probably infinitely less than its supposed value--was sufficient to
enable her to equip considerable naval forces, certainly larger ones
numerically than any which England alone was able to bring against
them.
Knowledge of the fact that Spain was preparing the Armada for an attack
on England, led to the sailing of Drake in April, 1587, with a fleet
consisting of four large and twenty-six smaller ships, for the hire of
which the citizens of London were nominally or actually responsible.
His real instructions are not known, but there is little question that,
as in all similar expeditions, he started out knowing that his success
would be approved of, although in the event of any ill-success or
awkward questions, he would be publicly disavowed.
Reaching Cadiz, he destroyed 100 store ships which he found there;
and then proceeding to the Tagus, offered battle to the Spanish war
fleet. The Spanish admiral, however, declined to come out--a fact
which of itself altogether discredits the popular idea about the vast
all-powerful ships of Spain, and the little English ships, which,
in the Armada days, could have done nothing against them but for a
convenient tempest. On account of this expedition of Drake’s, the
sailing of the Armada was put off for a year. So far as stopping the
enterprise was concerned, Drake’s expedition was a failure. Armada
preparations still went on.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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