The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
It remains to add that the ship was extraordinarily well built. She
fought many a battle and survived some fifty years, and then only
perished because, when laid up for refit in 1696, she was accidentally
burned. And about sixty-three years ago (1852) naval architects still
alluded to her with respect, nor did their designs differ from her very
materially.
Wherever and however Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham failed, their
shipbuilding policy cannot but command both respect and admiration.
It is the curious irony of fate that--excepting King Alfred, and
also Queen Elizabeth--it is the Sovereigns of England with black
marks against them who ever did most for the Navy or understood its
importance. And understanding what the Navy meant, generally secured
these marks at the hands of some quite well meaning but intellectually
circumscribed prototype or successor of John Hampden, to whom “meeting
the enemy on the water” was an entirely indigestible theory, and a
waste of money into the bargain. There is no question whatever that
to them the sea appeared a natural rampart and ships upon it pure
superfluity, save in so far as inconvenience to the shore counties
might result. Later on, Cromwell, of course, acted on a different
principle--but Cromwell was an Imperialist. Hampden was merely the
“Insular Spirit” personified.
In 1639, a naval incident occurred which goes to discredit the popular
idea of the impotence of the British Navy under Charles I, whatever its
internal condition. Naval operations were in progress between Holland
and France on the one side, and Spain on the other. The British fleet
was fitted out under Sir John Pennington (that same Pennington who had
commanded the squadron which refused to attack La Rochelle) with orders
to maintain British neutrality.
The Spanish fleet took refuge from the Dutch in the Downs, whereupon
Pennington informed the rival admirals that he should attack whichever
of them violated the neutrality of an English harbour. The Spanish
having fired upon the Dutch, the Dutch Admiral Van Tromp applied to
Pennington for permission to attack the Downs. This was given, and the
bulk of the Spanish fleet destroyed. The incident suggests that the
English fleet was recognised as a neutral able to enforce its orders
against all and sundry.
In connection with this, it is interesting to record the existence of
a naval medal of the period, bearing the motto: “_Nec meta mihi quae
terminus orbi_”--a free translation of which would be, “Nothing limits
me but the size of the World.” However short practice may have fallen,
Charles and his advisers had undoubtedly grasped the theory of “Sea
Power.”
_THE CIVIL WAR._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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