===============+=============+=========== Financial Year.| Amount. | Personnel. ---------------|-------------|----------- 1869 | 9,996,641 | 63,000 1870 | 9,370,530 | 61,000 1871 | 9,789,956 | 61,000 1872 | 9,532,149 | 61,000 1873 | 9,899,725 | 60,000 1874 | 10,440,105 | 60,000 1875 | 10,825,194 | 60,000 1876 | 11,288,872 | 60,000 1877 | 10,971,829 | 60,000 1878 | 12,129,901 | 60,000 1879 | 10,586,894 | 58,800 1880 | 10,566,935 | 58,800 1881 | 10,945,919 | 58,100 1882 | 10,483,901 | 57,500 1883 | 10,899,500 | 57,250 1884 | 11,185,770 | 56,950 1885 | 12,694,900 | 58,334 ===============+=============+=========== II. THE WHITE ERA. The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887 mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report upon them, especially with regard to the following points:-- “The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of-- (a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports to be blockaded with an inshore squadron. (b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base, with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet. (c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet, as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet. “The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient manner of utilising them. “As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection. “As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying contribution. “As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation. “As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the vessels employed, and their cause.”