Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of the 15th and 16th 129 Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130 The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney’s report of the state of his command had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M. 131 The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left 131, 132 Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness of Ney’s command 132, 133 Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal Blücher 134, 135 He seems to have thought this probable 136 But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre Bras 137 The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole army 138 NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139 1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the 16th not deserved 139 Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz 139, n. [310] 2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night 140 3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies 140 4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution on the part of Napoleon 140 5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies—Chesney and Clinton 141 His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as to this 141, 142 His object was to destroy the allied armies in succession—Jomini 142 CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY: BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT 143 Blücher concentrated his army without receiving any assurance of support from Wellington 143 He got Wellington’s letter about noon of the 16th 144 Wellington arrived at Brye at 1 P.M. 144 Their conversation 144 Wellington gave no unconditional promise 145 Blücher’s decision to fight was arrived at before he heard from or saw Wellington 146 And on entirely independent grounds 147