NOTE TO CHAPTER X 148 Blücher’s reasons for deciding to accept battle at Ligny as given by Damitz 148 He was unwilling to retreat 148 Suggestions of Ollech and Delbrück not of any value here 149 Blücher expected to concentrate his whole army of 120,000 men 149 And was unwilling to change his decision when he found he could not count upon Bülow’s arrival 150 CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 151 Position of the Prussian army at Ligny 151 Napoleon examines the position 152 The most obvious plan of battle was to turn the Prussian right 152 But Napoleon decides to attack the centre 153 Positions taken by the French 153, 154 The 2 P.M. order sent to Ney to coöperate with the main army 154 The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny and St. Amand 154 The 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 155 Napoleon determines about half-past five o’clock to put in the Guard 156 The unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps causes a delay of nearly two hours 157 The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre 158 The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe 159 Losses of the Prussians and French 159 The non-employment of the 6th Corps 159, 160 Extent of the victory 160, 161 It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it had disposed of the Prussians for a time 161, 162 NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 163 1. Napoleon’s delay in beginning the battle 163 His reasons considered 164 2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat and others 164 Napoleon’s reply to Rogniat 165 His reasons for taking the course he did 165 The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered 166 3. Clausewitz’s doubts as to the decisive result of Ney’s movement 167 The question fully stated and Napoleon’s expectations justified 167 4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney 168