Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon to Quatre Bras 181 It was probably the staff-officer who carried the 2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from the turnpike 182 For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Ney alone was responsible 182 He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and Liberchies 182, 183 In this he deliberately disobeyed orders 183 He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade of Kellermann’s Corps 183 Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven back with loss 184 The French retire to Frasnes 184 The casualties on both sides 184 If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is probable that Wellington would have been badly beaten 184, 185 If Ney had concentrated his whole command between 12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would probably have been evacuated 185, 186 In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist Napoleon 186 Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management 186 Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops 187, 188 NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 189 1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry 189 2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of the matter in his Memoirs 190 But his principal censure on Ney for not having got his command together and used it as a whole, is fully borne out 191 3. Curious error of Siborne’s 191 4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march to Frasnes 192 It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in any event, and therefore cannot be accepted 193 5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order from Soult to d’Erlon 193 Reasons for thinking that this order must have been directed to Ney 194 Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 195 The evidence on certain minor points conflicting 196 CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 197 _Résumé_ of the campaign up to date 197