5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, considering that he could not absolutely rely on Ney’s coöperation 169 6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remain and take part in the battle 170 He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come upon the field for this purpose 170 And there was not time to send him orders 170 7. Napoleon’s skill well displayed at Ligny 171 Clausewitz’s review of the battle 171-173 He points out that Napoleon was more economical in the use of his troops than Blücher 171 Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davout on Napoleon’s tactics 173 Napoleon not responsible for the error which brought d’Erlon on the field 174 8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the progress of the battle on the appearance of the strange corps (d’Erlon’s),—_Quære_ 174-175 9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made use of the 6th Corps 175 CHAPTER XII: THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS 176 _Résumé_ of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoon of the 16th 176 He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosselies in the early morning 177 He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as he was ordered to do 177 He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions of Bachelu, Foy and Piré 178 Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M. 178 Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M. 178 Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M. 178 Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M. 179 At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field 179 Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps 179 Its delay in starting 180 Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St. Amand 180 The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about 5 P.M. 180 It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at Frasnes about 4.30 P.M. 181 This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division had passed through Frasnes 181 Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinary state of things 181