The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317 They are formed in columns of battalions and march in _échelon_, the right in advance 317 Premature attack of a body of French horse on the left of the Guard 317 No support furnished by Reille 318 Admirable conduct of d’Erlon 318 The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s brigade of guards 319 Captain Powell’s account 319 The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten 320 General Maitland’s account 321 Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett 322 The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue to advance 323 But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment 324 And are completely overthrown 324 The failure of the attack largely due to the absence of supports 324 Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field 324 The French right wing retires in confusion 325 Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur 325 Exertions of Napoleon to restore order 325 He is finally forced to retire 326 The French retreat blocked at Genappe 326 The result of the battle due to the intervention of the Prussians 327 Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained Bülow and Pirch I. 328 Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 328 NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329 1. The French tactics generally censured 329 Napoleon and Ney both to blame 329 Injurious effect on the French chances of success of Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit 330 The attack on Hougomont criticised 330 The defence of Planchenoit praised 331 2. The English tactics exceedingly good 331 3. The attack of the Imperial Guard 331 A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns 332 B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered 333 The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses 334