The great credit due to Colborne 335 4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered 336 Zieten’s intervention not anticipated 336 The English reported as growing weaker 337 Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337 Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both respects 337 The charge of the Guard might have been properly supported 338 Contrast between Ney and Wellington 338 Note on Ney’s state of mind 338, n. [777] 5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339 6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance of Grouchy’s force marching from the Dyle 339 7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption of Zieten’s Corps 340 The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch army at the close of the action 341 8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy for the intervention of the Prussians 341 Both are responsible for it 342 CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 343 The principal points treated of in this book 343-350 APPENDIX A. On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs 351 Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others 351 Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory 352 He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the orders which he gave 352 Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the 16th 352 The same thing probably true as to the order sent to Grouchy 353 The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probably never sent 354 And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten 354 APPENDIX B. On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order 355 Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published in Philadelphia that he received on the 17th any written order 355 He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand order was among the major-general’s papers 356 Publication of the order in 1842 357 It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs 357 Original text of the Bertrand Order 358