“All writers who have treated of this campaign set out by saying that Buonaparte threw himself between the two armies, in order to separate them. This expression, however, which has become a _terminus technicus_ in military phraseology, has no clear idea for its foundation. The space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation.[11] It would have been very unfortunate if a commander like Buonaparte, having to deal with an enemy of twice his force, instead of falling on the one half with his united strength, had lighted on the empty interval, and thus made a blow in the air, losing his time, whilst he can only double his own force by the strictest economy of that commodity. Even the fighting the one army in a direction by which it will be pressed away from the other, even if it can be effected without loss of time, incurs the great danger of being attacked in the rear by the other. If the latter, therefore, be not far enough removed to put this risk out of the question, a commander will scarcely venture on such a line of attack. Buonaparte, therefore, chose the direction between the two armies, _not in order to separate them by wedging himself between_,[12] but because he expected to find and fall on Blücher’s force in this direction, either united or in separate bodies [corps].” _Feldzug von 1815_, &c., p. 54:[13] * * * * * * * * His main object was evidently to find the Prussian army, and beat it.” Nevertheless we find Hooper,[14] who wrote long after Clausewitz, making the very statement which Clausewitz thought so objectionable:— “He (Napoleon) calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two armies he should be able _to wedge himself in between them_, crushing any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and, having won a position of vantage, he imagined that it would be in his power to manœuvre with rapidity from side to side and defeat each army in succession.” To the same effect writes Quinet:— “He (Napoleon) will place himself between the two armies, at the centre of the line, that is to say, at the extreme right of the Prussian cantonments. By this move, the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher will be separated from the first hour. The occasion, the moment, will decide on which of the two armies it will be best to strike the first blow.”[15] It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so well said above in opposition to this view. It is plain that these writers have misconceived Napoleon’s plan. But we must consider this more fully.