[5] See Clausewitz, chaps. 8, 14. [6] Gourgaud, pp. 42, 43. [7] Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 195, 197, 198. [8] _Ante_, pp. 4 _et seq._ [9] Ellesmere, pp. 161, 162. See Maurice, pp. 333 _et seq._; Jan. 1891. [10] In the edition of 1850, this passage (as we suppose it to be) is found in vol. xiii, p. 625, and reads somewhat differently, but the idea is precisely the same. [11] Thiers; vol. xx, book lx, p. 23, says: “He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians * * * would leave between their respective forces a space, not very strongly guarded, and he thought that, by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point, he might become master of the position.” [12] The italics are our own. [13] In the edition of 1862, this passage is found in Chap. 22 on pages 46 and 47. [14] Hooper, p. 58. See also, by the same author, Wellington, p. 207. To the same effect, see Clinton, p. 378. _Cf._ Rogniat, Considérations, p. 339, who was the first to announce this theory. [15] Quinet, p. 75. [16] Réponse, &c., pp. 261, 262. [17] Jomini, p. 122, 123; also, pp. 213, 225, 226. [18] La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 41, 42; also, pp. 73 _et seq._ [19] Charras, vol. I, pp. 115, 116. See also Quinet, p. 101,—“Pour empêcher la réunion (of the English and Prussian armies) il était indispensable de fermer à la fois les deux passages (Sombreffe and Quatre Bras).” [20] Siborne (vol. I, p. 47) is perfectly clear on this point. [21] Corresp.: vol. 31, p. 471. [22] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 14. CHAPTER II. THE FRENCH ARMY.