“The French army, occupying these places [Quatre Bras and Sombreffe] in force, would find itself placed between the Anglo-Dutch and the Prussians, thenceforward really capable,—to borrow from Napoleon his own expression,—of attacking them in detail, leaving to them, if they would escape from this misfortune,—the greatest that could befall them,—only the alternative of yielding ground and of uniting their forces at Brussels or beyond it.”[19] Against this array of authority we oppose with confidence that of Napoleon himself, of Wellington, and of Clausewitz. It was Napoleon’s expectation, as we have seen above, that the Prussian army would be the first to be concentrated, that it would offer battle at or near Fleurus, and that he would be able to attack and overcome it before it could be joined by the Anglo-Dutch forces.[20] If Blücher fought at all at that stage in the campaign, it stood to reason that he would fight _to the south_ of Sombreffe, _for the preservation of his line of communication with Wellington_,—the Namur-Nivelles road. Hence, the intention of occupying Sombreffe, _as a preliminary to a battle with the Prussians_, could not, as we venture to think, have entered Napoleon’s mind. On the contrary, he believed that the seizure of Sombreffe would inevitably necessitate the retreat of the Prussians to some point further north, as Wavre, or even to the neighborhood of Brussels, where their junction with the English could be effected without molestation.[21] But the last thing which Napoleon wanted was that the allied armies should retire to Wavre, or to the neighborhood of Brussels, and there unite. He needed a battle, and a decisive success,[22] and he needed it at once. A war of manœuvres was not the game for him to play at this crisis. It was of vital importance for him to rout, if possible, in succession, the armies of Blücher and Wellington; a battle, therefore, was what he sought, and he expected that Blücher would fight him, and fight him alone. It was only by routing Blüchers army, or forcing it to retreat, that he expected to separate it from that of Wellington. It must also be borne in mind, that the mere occupation of two points on the line of communication between two allied armies does not in any way prevent the unimpeded concentration of each army, and its being moved, when concentrated, in any direction that its commander may decide on. The “line of communication” seized is not to be confounded with the line of supplies or the line of retreat of either army. No doubt, the occupation of any point or points on the line by which two allied armies communicate with each other tends to embarrass them, to hinder any combined movements, and to delay their union; but to direct the march of an invading army merely to compass this end, when it is possible to defeat one of these opposing armies by engaging it where it cannot be supported by its ally, is to miss the opportunity of the campaign. FOOTNOTES: