The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediate supervision 47 Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and 16th 48 Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney 48, 49 He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Piré to Frasnes 49 And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies 49 Backwardness of the 1st Corps 50-52 At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 51 D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness 52 Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on the evening of the 15th 53 He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe 53 He expected Blücher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wellington 53 He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of the 15th 54 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55 1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff 56 2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 _et seq._ Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and unsatisfactory 56 A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61 Rogniat’s criticism 57 Napoleon’s answer 57 Charras and Jomini 58, 59 Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations 59 The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon 60 B. The question as regards the non-occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63 (1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61 (2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62 3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63 4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64 The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs 64 The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th 65