The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th 65, n. [122] The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value 66-67 The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69 That no mention is made in the written orders of the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69 CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 70 Blücher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate at Sombreffe 70 And without consulting Wellington 70 The nature of the understanding between them 70 _et seq._ Müffling’s statement generally misunderstood 71 There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details 72 Bülow’s disobedience of orders 73 Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full information of the situation 73 Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels 74 He retained his headquarters at Brussels 74 He thought it probable that the French would advance by way of Mons 74 Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75 The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance 76 And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P.M. of the 15th 77 Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and 7 P.M. 77 They were simply for the concentration of the various divisions of his army 78 But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78 Information that Blücher is concentrating at Sombreffe arrives in the evening at Brussels 78 And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After Orders” which direct a general movement towards the east 79 Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequent orders of the Duke 79 The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 80 Müffling’s statement 80 The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond 81, n. [170]