Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy 96 Opinions of Charras and Napoleon 97, 98 6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98 But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at Quatre Bras undeserved 99 Because this decision of Wellington’s was based on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100 CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS 101 Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies Quatre Bras in the afternoon of the 15th 101 And is attacked by Reille’s advance between 5 and 6 P.M. 101 The other brigade of Perponcher’s division, Bylandt’s, ordered there also 102 The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6 A.M. of the 16th 102 NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 103 Maurice’s criticism on the occupation of Quatre Bras by the Dutch-Belgian generals 103 But the fact that they knew of the concentration of the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe fully justifies their course 103, 104 CHAPTER VII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON 105 The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A.M. of the 16th 105 And rides at once to Quatre Bras 106 His letter to Blücher 106 Comparison of the statements in the Letter with those in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey 107-108 He evidently accepted the “Disposition” as conclusive 108 He rides over to Brye to confer with Blücher 108 And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P.M. 109 No doubt expecting to find a large part of his army there 109 Delbrück’s theory, that the Duke deliberately misrepresented the situation of his army, entirely unsupported 109, 110 NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 111 1. Actual positions of Wellington’s divisions at 7 A.M. of the 16th 111-113 2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he would have stayed at Quatre Bras,—_quære_ 114 3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in the matter of the transmission of intelligence from the front 114-115