The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey have been lost 81 The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th 82 They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83 This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton’s division at Waterloo 83 It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M. of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. [182] But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher and the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition 85 Character and meaning of the “Disposition” 86 The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of the Letter to Blücher 87-88 Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 88 But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton 88 His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89 NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90 1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo” 90 Its surprising statements 90 2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington and Blücher in the event of a French invasion 91 3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness in deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras 92 4. Wellington’s original intention of concentrating at Nivelles considered 93 It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93 A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffe he could run no great risk in concentrating at Quatre Bras 94 B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so 94 If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny 95 C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition 95, 96 5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied armies criticized 96