And if this be true of structure, it is still more obviously true of doctrine. Granted that there be such a society with a claim to infallible pronouncement upon the things essential to the satisfaction of the human soul, how can it proceed save by exact definition of its pronouncements? Begin with the vague and general, though perhaps intense, conviction that the soul survives death. Regard it not as a product of affection or of habit. Accept the mere intuition. What then? Does it survive as a person or not? The thing is debatable. If it does not survive as a person, what connection is there between its survival and good or evil conduct in this life? If it does survive as a person, how can such survival hold of our personality, which, being human, is manifestly of this changeable and material world? If it be said that no answer can be given to these questions, then we deny the existence of such an authority as I here presume. I do not say that these questions and the replies to them are a proof of the truth of such authority. I say that on the hypothesis that such an authority is to be found on earth, then necessarily it must of its very nature _define_ doctrine upon such matters as these, pronouncement upon which is its whole reason for being. As each controversy of importance arises some new definition will necessarily be demanded of the authority. Therefore, though doctrine itself does not grow--for it concerns truths outside time--definition of doctrine will grow. The time in which we live has so largely lost the habit of clear thought that I must here admit a digression in order to emphasise and put in the sharpest light the difference between the growth of _doctrine_ and the growth of _definition_. Whenever a new definition is given by the Church--e.g., the definition of Infallibility in 1870, the definition of Transubstantiation in 1215--confused thinkers, or men who have not read the proceedings, will assert that a new doctrine has been invented. A little attention to what passes at the time of such definitions should be enough to set them right. The whole debate turns upon the proof that the doctrine was present from the beginning and that innovation lies in the denial of it. The definition is a new thing to meet a new attack upon an ancient truth. The truth is aboriginal. Definition no more makes new doctrine than does a new treatise on geometry make new mathematical truth. Such matters are expounded and elucidated in increasing volume; they are not invented. So it is with the Faith. From this, turn to another consequence of this objection to _organisation_ in the Church: the objection that its machinery and instruments of action are continually unworthy, base, insufficient, affected by worldly motives, and that therefore the claim of the Church to be divine fails.