(36.) Some trifling regulations have to be followed in certain places, some duties have to be fulfilled at certain times, and some decorum has to be observed by certain persons, which could not be divined by the most intelligent people, and which custom teaches without any trouble: we should, therefore, not condemn men who omit these things, as they have not been taught them, neither should we decide their characters by the shape of their nails or the curl of their hair; if we do form such a judgment we shall soon find out our error. (37.) I doubt whether it be lawful to judge of some men by a single fault, or if extreme necessity, a violent passion, or a sudden impulse prove anything. (38.) If we wish to know the truth about certain affairs or certain persons, we should believe the very opposite of the reports circulated about them. (39.) Unless we are very firm and pay continual attention to what we utter, we are liable to say “yes” and “no” about the same thing or person in an hourʼs time, induced to do this merely by a sociable and friendly disposition, which naturally leads a person not to contradict men who hold different opinions. (40.) A partial man is exposed to frequent mortifications; for it is as impossible for his favourites always to be happy or wise as for those who are out of his favour always to be at fault or unfortunate; and, therefore, he often is put out of countenance either through the failure of his friends, or some glorious deed done by those whom he dislikes. (41.) A man liable to be prejudiced who ventures to accept an ecclesiastical or civil dignity is like a blind man wishing to be an artist, a dumb man who would be an orator, or a deaf man desiring to judge a symphony; these are but faint comparisons imperfectly expressing the wretchedness of prejudice. Besides, prejudice is a desperate and incurable disease, contaminating all who approach the patient, so that his equals, inferiors, relatives, friends, and even the doctors abandon him; it is past their skill to work any cure if they cannot make him confess what is his disease, and acknowledge that the remedies to heal it are to listen, to doubt, to inquire, and to examine. Flatterers, rogues, and slanderers, those who never open their mouths but to lie or to advance their own interests, are the quacks in whom he trusts, and who make him swallow all they please; they thus poison and kill him. (42.) Descartesʼ rule never to decide on the slightest truth before it is clearly and distinctly understood is sufficiently grand and correct to extend to the judgment we form of persons. (43.) Some men have a bad opinion of our intellect, morals, and manners; but we are well revenged when we see the worthless and base character of their favourites. On this principle a man of merit is neglected and a blockhead admired. (44.) A blockhead is a man without enough intelligence to be a coxcomb. (45.) A blockhead thinks a coxcomb a man of merit.