The "City Guard": A History of Company "B" First Regiment Infantry, N. G. C. During the Sacremento Campaign, July 3 to 26, 1894: Including a Brief History of the Company Since Its Organization March 31, 1854, to July 3, 1894California. Infantry. First Regiment. Company B
History
The "City Guard": A History of Company "B" First Regiment Infantry, N. G. C. During the Sacremento Campaign, July 3 to 26, 1894: Including a Brief History of the Company Since Its Organization March 31, 1854, to July 3, 1894
California. Infantry. First Regiment. Company B
California -- History -- 1850-1950; California. Infantry. First Regiment. Company B; Railroad Strike, Calif., 1894; Railroads -- United States -- Employees
The court of inquiry showed plainly that the reports made by the
commanding officers of the National Guard, and the charges appearing in
the press concerning the demoralization and untrustworthiness of the
troops were utterly false; that the rank and file, with the exception
of two companies mentioned elsewhere,[4] “were at all times under good
discipline, and behaved with becoming courage and loyalty.” The court
further found that certain officers greatly magnified the reports
concerning the physical debility of the men. The court, in summing up,
says: “There were men in the ranks, plenty and willing to retrieve the
day, when at three o’clock, after standing patiently in the sun for
three hours, they received their first orders, which were to move off
and abandon the attempt to take the depot.” Thus the rank and file were
finally vindicated after being for some time the object for obloquy by
the public and press.
[4] One of these companies was a Sacramento company whose members were
mostly employed by the railroad and therefor in sympathy with the
strikers, in fact some of them were strikers. The other company was a
company of the Third Regiment. Concerning this latter company, there
are many extenuating circumstances. Had the officers remained with
their company there is no doubt but what it would have been as reliable
as any other.
The question, who was to blame for the failure on the Fourth, we
would gladly leave at this place unanswered were it not for the fact
that an implication is worse than an assertion. So we again refer to
the report of the court of inquiry. Here it is shown that, on that
memorable occasion, “General Sheehan refused to obey orders, directly
communicated to him by Major General Dimond, to effect an entrance
into the depot by force, and to fire upon the mob if they refused to
give way”; it was further shown, that when the officer, upon whom the
command of the Second Brigade had devolved, received distinct orders
from Major General Dimond to clear the depot, by force if necessary,
he left his command and urged the commanding General not to compel
him to obey the order, as his men were demoralized and could not be
relied upon. It was upon this representation that an armistice was
entered into between the United States marshal and the strikers.
Here we have the case in a nutshell. _No orders were given to the
troops to advance at any time that afternoon against the strikers._ A
spirit of hesitation prevailed amongst the commanding officers. When
decisive action should have been taken questions of constitutional
law were debated by them at length. Instead of an officer executing
the commands transmitted to him by a superior officer he would desire
to know where his superior officer received authority to give such an
order. Just think of it, men who have been occupying high places in
the National Guard for years, questioning at the time for action the
authority of their superior officers and preventing decisive action by
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