had undervalued, if it bring him back to this, is a blessing; and then the result may be stated in the words of Gray:-- "See the wretch who long has tost On the thorny bed of pain, At length regain his vigor lost, And breathe and walk again." Then, "The meanest flow'ret of the vale, The simplest note that swells the gale, The common sun, the air, the skies, To him are opening paradise!" Then, though he may hold little property by that title which the law gives, he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes for which it was intended to act on the spirit: "His are the mountains, and the valleys his, And the resplendent rivers;" and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a child. The simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a man again. But again, I infer that there is a connexion between good taste and good morals, because there is an analogy between those qualities in matter which excite the emotions of taste, and those relations on which morals depend. So much is this the case, that some philosophers found morality upon a theory of the beautiful, considering it a sublime harmony. In all beautiful objects in nature, or in art, there is an order, a propriety, a fitness, a proportion; and the impression which these make upon us is so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct, that we use the same terms to express both. To me, indeed, it seems that beauty in matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason, or what the light of the moon is to that of the sun; containing some of the same elements, but destitute of the highest. Hence, as we should naturally expect, morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume. "Is aught so fair, In all the dewy landscape of the spring, In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn, In nature's fairest forms, is aught so fair As virtuous friendship?"