The Contemporary Review, Volume 36, October 1879Various
History
The Contemporary Review, Volume 36, October 1879
Various
Arts -- Periodicals; Literature -- Periodicals; Political science -- Periodicals
The doctrine of association may be referred to the fundamental law that
all ideas rising simultaneously or successively in the human mind, tend
invariably to recall each other in the same order; this is what is
called association of ideas. When any two ideas have thus been
constantly associated without ever being separated (as, for instance,
form and colour), they unite indissolubly and thus become necessary
laws. Now, of all these necessary connections, the most universal is
this: no phenomenon ever appears without having been preceded by some
other phenomenon, which is always the same under the same circumstances.
This law is that of causality, which is both the supreme principle and,
at the same time, the result of all experience. To this doctrine of J.
S. Mill and Alexander Bain our author opposes the two following
objections:--1st, How does it explain the generalization? 2nd, How does
it explain the necessity of the laws of the understanding? On the first
point the English School appeals to a law that it calls the law of
_similarity_ or faculty of identifying the like in the different. But
this is indeed, strictly speaking, a fact of association? Should not
association, properly understood, be reduced to the law of
contiguity--that is to say, to the fact of our ideas only becoming
associated through relations of time? To admit the faculty of
recognizing similarity in diversity, what is this but to admit mind,
intelligence--something, in short, which is other than a simple external
association? As to the second point, can we reduce the rational
necessity that Kant and Leibnitz have laid down as the criterion of _à
priori_ principles to a pure necessity of habit--that is to say, to the
automatic expectation of the future inscribed on the past? Where is the
scientific guarantee in this hypothesis? Why should Nature bend to our
habits? "Who can assure us that we do not dream in thinking of the
future, and that the next sensation may not interrupt our dream by an
unforeseen shock?" We see how far-reaching this doubt is; it affects not
only metaphysic but science as well.
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