It is doubtful whether one could find in the ponderous tomes of scholastic divinity anything surpassing in comical _non sequiturs_ and sheer nonsense the forensic eloquence of eminent lawyers as transmitted to us in the records of legal proceedings of this kind. Although the counsel for the defendants, as we have seen, ventured to question the propriety and validity of such prosecutions, his scepticism does not seem to have been taken seriously, but was evidently smiled at as the trick of a pettifogger bound to use every artifice to clear his clients. In the writings of mediæval jurisprudents the right and fitness of inflicting judicial punishment upon animals appear to have been generally admitted. Thus Guy Pape, in his _Decisions of the Parliament of Grenoble_ (Qu. 238), raises the query, whether a brute beast, if it commit a crime, as pigs sometimes do in devouring children, ought to suffer death, and answers the question unhesitatingly in the affirmative: “_si animal brutum delinquat, sicut quandoque faciunt porci qui comedunt pueros, an debeat mori? Dico quod sic._” Jean Duret, in his elaborate Treatise on Pains and Penalties (_Traicté des Peines et des Amendes_, p. 250; cf. _Thémis Jurisconsulte_, VIII. p. 57), takes the same view, declaring that “if beasts not only wound, but kill and eat any person, as experience has shown to happen frequently in cases of little children being eaten by pigs, they should pay the forfeit of their lives and be condemned to be hanged and strangled, in order to efface the memory of the enormity of the deed.” The distinguished Belgian jurist, Jodocus Damhouder, discusses this question in his _Rerum Criminalium Praxis_ (cap. CXLII.), and holds that the beast is punishable, if it commits the crime through natural malice, and not through the instigation of others, but that the owner can redeem it by paying for the damage done; nevertheless he is not permitted to keep ferocious or malicious beasts and let them run at large, so as to be a constant peril to the community. Occasionally a more enlightened jurist had the common-sense and courage to protest against such perversions and travesties of justice. Thus Pierre Ayrault, _lieutenant-criminel au siége présidial d’Angers_, published at Angers, in 1591, a small quarto entitled: _Des Procez faicts au Cadaver, aux Cendres, à la Mémoire, aux Bestes brutes, aux Choses inanimées et aux Contumax_, in which he argued that corpses, the ashes and the memory of the dead, brute beasts and inanimate things are not legal persons (_legales homines_) and therefore do not come within the jurisdiction of a court. Curiously enough a case somewhat analogous to those discussed by Pierre Ayrault was adjudicated upon only a few years ago. A Frenchman bequeathed his property to his own corpse, in behalf of which his entire estate was to be administered, the income to be expended for the preservation of his mortal remains and the