Such was the district into which the IXth Army Corps was launched in the night of August 6–7. As has been mentioned, Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Stopford had arrived in the middle of July to take command, and for a short time had succeeded General Hunter-Weston in command of the VIIIth Army Corps at Helles, so as to gain experience in Peninsula warfare. He had entered the Grenadier Guards in the early “Seventies”; had seen the usual service of officers at the end of last century, in India, West Africa, and Egypt; during the South African War he was Military Secretary to General Buller, and entered Ladysmith with him at the relief. Since then he had occupied various military positions at home and was still on the Active List though a little over sixty. His reputation stood high as a student and teacher of military history, and long experience had given him an accurate knowledge of army routine. But he had never held high command in the field, and neither history nor routine in itself inspires to action; still less do years of official duty in the Metropolis. Rather they suppress the hopeful buoyancy of spirit and rapid fertility of resource essential for generalship, while they tend to accentuate the hesitating deliberation and cautious apprehension of risk which too often develop with increasing years. Habits mainly sedentary are also likely to reduce the enthusiasm for physical activity as middle age is passing. At the same time it is fair to remember that the force now entrusted to General Stopford for this vital enterprise was an Army Corps only in name. Nominally it consisted of the 10th, 11th, and 13th Divisions, composed as we have seen. But the 13th Division (Major-General Shaw) had been deflected to Anzac for the assault against Sari Bair, together with the 29th Brigade (Brigadier-General Cooper) of the 10th Division. General Stopford was thus left with only the 11th (Northern) Division under Major-General Hammersley, and two brigades of the 10th (Irish) Division under Lieut.-General Sir Bryan Mahon. All the battalions in these Divisions were New Army men, and had never been in action before. Normally each Division should have possessed sixteen batteries of artillery (including the H.Q. Divisional Artillery), so that (allowing for the absence of the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade) the IXth Army Corps should have commanded twenty-eight batteries, or 112 guns; whereas, at the time of landing, it had only one Field Artillery battery and two Highland Mountain batteries of small calibre--old and useless for service--counting twelve guns in all.[177] It is true that General Stopford could also command the support of naval guns, but by the nature of the case the guns had been unable to register for fear of thwarting the surprise, the maps were uncertain, and most of the Suvla plain was invisible from the sea owing to its flatness.