But we enter on the subject of conduct when we begin to study such
combinations among the actions of sensory and motor organs as are
externally manifested. Suppose that instead of observing those
contractions of muscles by which the optic axes are converged and the
foci of the eyes adjusted (which is a portion of physiology), and
that instead of observing the co-operation of other nerves, muscles
and bones, by which a hand is moved to a particular place and the
fingers closed (which is also a portion of physiology), we observe
a weapon being seized by a hand under guidance of the eyes. We now
pass from the thought of combined internal functions to the thought of
combined external motions. Doubtless, if we could trace the cerebral
processes which accompany these, we should find an inner physiological
co-ordination corresponding with the outer co-ordination of actions.
But this admission is consistent with the assertion, that when we
ignore the internal combination and attend only to the external
combination, we pass from a portion of physiology to a portion of
conduct. For though it may be objected that the external combination
instanced is too simple to be rightly included under the name conduct,
yet a moment's thought shows that it is joined with what we call
conduct by insensible gradations. Suppose the weapon seized is used to
ward off a blow. Suppose a counter-blow is given. Suppose the aggressor
runs and is chased. Suppose there comes a struggle and a handing him
over to the police. Suppose there follow the many and varied acts
constituting a prosecution. Obviously the initial adjustment of an
act to an end, inseparable from the rest, must be included with them
under the same general head; and obviously from this initial simple
adjustment, having intrinsically no moral character, we pass by degrees
to the most complex adjustments and to those on which moral judgments
are passed.
Hence, excluding all internal co-ordinations, our subject here is the
aggregate of all external co-ordinations; and this aggregate includes
not only the simplest as well as the most complex performed by human
beings, but also those performed by all inferior beings considered as
less or more evolved.
§ 4. Already the question: What constitutes advance in the evolution of
conduct, as we trace it up from the lowest types of living creatures to
the highest? has been answered by implication. A few examples will now
bring the answer into conspicuous relief.
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