_Men._ But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. 77 [Sidenote: Virtue, according to Meno, is the desire of the honourable and the good. His definition is analysed by Socrates.] _Soc._ Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern. _Men._ Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too— ‘Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.’ _Soc._ And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? _Men._ Certainly. _Soc._ Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? _Men._ I think not. _Soc._ There are some who desire evil? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? [Sidenote: _The desire of good and evil._] _Men._ Both, I think. _Soc._ And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding? _Men._ Certainly I do. _Soc._ And desire is of possession? _Men._ Yes, of possession. [Sidenote: Men desire evil, but not what they think to be evil.] _Soc._ And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? _Men._ There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm. _Soc._ And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils? _Men._ Certainly not. _Soc._ Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods? _Men._ Yes, in that case. _Soc._ Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them? _Men._ They must know it. _Soc._ And must they not suppose that those who are hurt 78 are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? _Men._ How can it be otherwise? _Soc._ But are not the miserable ill-fated? _Men._ Yes, indeed.